[Health-based risk adjustment. Effects and side effects].
Numerous health systems have introduced competition between health plans while banning risk-rated premiums. Risk adjustment for health plans is introduced to reduce incentives for risk selection and to create incentives for health plans to permanently invest in care for the chronically ill. According to the international health economics state of the art, risk adjustment in the German social health insurance system has used information on health status (measured by diagnoses and drug prescriptions) on top of demographic information since 2009. In non-competitive health care systems similar mechanisms are sometimes established, e.g. to achieve an equitable distribution of resources between regions. An evaluation of the first year of health-based risk adjustment demonstrates a superior performance in comparison to the old, demographic risk adjustment. The old risk adjustment formula (without ex post high-cost pooling) showed R(2) of 5.8%, CPM of 10.4% and MAPE of 2,226 €, in contrast to the new health status-based risk adjustment formula (without cash benefit for sick allowance) which reaches R(2) 20.2%, CPM 22.5% and MAPE 1,817 €. However, to make competition between health plans functional for improvement of quality and efficiency of health care, health plans must be granted additional instruments to act as prudent buyers of health care.